pfizer-manufacturing.com

A request for quotation reported to us in October 2026 asks the recipient to “source and submit a bid” for 31 units of a CHM-ACLZ-7531 PUMP, “in connection with our ongoing project”. It is written in the name of PFIZER MANUFACTURING BELGIUM (NV), addressed “Dear Team” rather than to a named person, and signed with a name and the title “Chief Executive Officer”. It asks for quotations to be sent to an address at pfizer-manufacturing.com.

The e-mail and the attached tender both print the address Rijksweg 12, 2870 Puurs-Sint-Amands, Belgium, and the VAT number BE 0400.778.165. The EU’s VIES service, checked on 14 October 2026, records that VAT number as valid and registered to NV PFIZER MANUFACTURING BELGIUM at that address. A genuine VAT number and address are easy to copy and say nothing about who sent a document.

Pfizer Manufacturing Belgium NV is a real company. This page makes no claim against Pfizer or its staff, whose name and company details appear in the e-mail and the tender.

The reply domain

The registry dates pfizer-manufacturing.com to 16 November 2025. It was registered through Tucows Domains Inc. for one year, and its name servers are at vivawebhost.com. Visiting the domain redirects to Pfizer’s website, www.pfizer.com, and the domain is set up to receive e-mail on a server named hydra.vivawebhost.com.

For comparison, the registry dates pfizer.com to 28 April 1992, registered through Com Laude, with its name servers at oraclecloud.net and its e-mail handled by servers at pphosted.com. All of these records were read on 14 October 2026.

The tender document

The attached one-page PDF is headed “REQUEST FOR QUOTATION” and carries the Pfizer logo, the bid reference BE-2026-503905 and the date 2026-10-13. It lists the same pump and quantity with a list of specifications, asks for quotations “on or before: 21/10/2026”, and states that the order “is placed in accordance with the Pfizer General Conditions”.

The file’s own properties record that it was produced with www.smallpdf.com, with a creation time of 12 October 2026, 22:59 (no time zone given), the author “ADMIN” and the title “file.pdf”.

Attachment: RFQ rfq.pdf (222 KB) sha256 7aa83836e8bcb2262672c0a2e5e2d67f8ba373a494918b24697af0cc8313348b

The same request elsewhere

On 14 October 2026, a buyer request on the directory site UAE Yellow Pages Online, shown as posted four weeks earlier, began with the same request as this e-mail: “Dear Team, We invites you to source and submit a bid for the supply of the pump model specified below for our review and possible approval in connection with our ongoing project.” It names the same product code with a quantity of 35, and gives the buyer’s address as Puurs-Sint-Amands, Belgium.

Why this shape of enquiry is dangerous

In the requests this register documents, the trader who receives the enquiry is the target. They do not stock the part, so they search for it, find a supplier, and pay that supplier in advance in order to fulfil an order that does not exist. Nothing ships, and the trader carries the loss.

What to do if you received this

• Do not send a quotation, and do not pay any supplier you found only by searching for the requested product.
• Verify the enquiring company through contact details you obtain independently — never those in the e-mail or its attachments.
• Check when the enquirer’s domain and the supplier’s domain were registered. Each check takes a minute.
• Report the message to your national cybercrime reporting service.