lmkengineering.com

A request for quotation sent on 15 September 2026 to undisclosed recipients, among them a European trading company, asked for 12 units of the FLX-FIP745 flexible impeller pump, “original only”. It came from a free Outlook.com mailbox with the sender name “Molgroup Chemical”, was written in English and Czech, was signed as a project manager of MOL Česká republika, s.r.o., and asked for quotations to be sent to an address at molgroup-chemicals.com. The attached tender document, reference MOL50082, is dated 15 September 2026, sets a deadline of 23 September 2026 and states payment terms of 100% by bank transfer upon inspection of the goods.

The registry dates molgroup-chemicals.com to 6 July 2026, registered for one year through Hostinger. The domain shows a parking page, and its DNS records are set up to receive e-mail.

The tender prints the identification number (IČO) 49450301. The Czech business register ARES records that number for MOL Česká republika, s.r.o., with its registered office at Moulíkova 3286/1b, Prague 5, rather than at the Prague 1 address the tender gives. A genuine registration number is easy to copy and says nothing about who sent a document.

The pump is offered by a site whose text is copied

lmkengineering.com offers the FLX-FIP745 pump, and its home page carries the code in its title. Every specification line on the data sheet attached to the e-mail — flow, head, power, temperature, viscosity, speed and material — appears on the site’s product page. The site lists three further codes: CP-FX465, SPP-2STX85 and PHM-HDX345.

Much of the site’s text is not its own. Many sentences on its home and About pages are identical to the website of an established pump company in South Africa, with that company’s three-letter name replaced by “LMK”, down to the same misspelling, “Enginnering”, in the page titles. We make no claim against that company, which has no connection to this case that we know of.

The registry dates lmkengineering.com to 6 September 2024, and the earliest copy of it held by the Internet Archive is from the same day. Its About page speaks of “our 23 years of operation”, and its contact page lists offices in the United States, Oman, Canada, Poland, the Netherlands and Vietnam. The domain uses the same name servers, sg1.ownmyserver.com and sg2.ownmyserver.com, as apexpumpengineering.com, the supplier in an earlier alert. A hosting provider serves many customers, so that alone proves nothing.

Why this shape of enquiry is dangerous

The trader who receives the request is the target. They do not stock the part, so they search for it, find a supplier, and pay that supplier in advance in order to fulfil an order that does not exist. Nothing ships, and the trader carries the loss.

A second request in the same week

A request impersonating Unilever reached the same company on 16 September 2026, asking for twelve ROBUST HD/SP-00 pumps. Its e-mail text matches this one almost word for word, both tender documents follow the same template and are dated 15 September 2026, and both documents name the same author in their file properties. See the alert for oceanpulsepump.com.

What to do if you received this

• Do not send a quotation, and do not pay any supplier you found only by searching for the requested product.
• Verify the enquiring company through contact details you obtain independently — never those in the e-mail or its attachments.
• Check when the enquirer’s domain and the supplier’s domain were registered. Each check takes a minute.
• Report the message to your national cybercrime reporting service.